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Abstract 
 
 
The qualitative research of this paper covers the most recent structural changes in the oil 
market and the Chinese economy. Its econometric analysis, based on a structural dynamic 
linear regression model, shows Chinese GDP growth rates, the Shanghai Stock Index and the 
CNY/USD exchange rate to have a significant impact on the monthly spot price of Brent 
Crude oil and improve the explanatory value of the base specification including US and 
China´s crude oil imports and the historic prices of Brent Crude for the time period of 2000 
to 2015.  A structural break of the model is found to be significant in December 2008. The 
consideration of the structural specific variables Chinese industrial production, urban 
investments and energy intensity enhance the explanatory value of the model for the sub-
samples 2000-2008 and 2009-2015 further. Its consideration of time lags and critical 
consideration of data allows for the confirmation of the observed fundamental changes in the 
oil market and China´s economy, which are change in the price elasticity of demand and 
supply, the strategic reserves of crude oil in China and the plateau of oil demand growth for 
urban areas. The analysis further finds, that the consideration of geopolitical events as 
dummy variables is not significant in most cases.  The analysis confirms the observation by 
some studies, that China´s imports have no significant impact on oil prices, but found other 
explanatory variables to be significant. This result stresses the importance of an economic 
analysis to allow for a careful consideration of data and the awareness of their limitations.  
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0.! Introduction 
 
 
In 2008, the international oil markets were strongly affected by the financial crisis. As 
the world economy only slowly recovered, oil prices did not reach the same price levels 
as before the crisis. Instead, oil prices fell to less than 30 USD/Barrel in 2016. This 
development was highly and controversially discussed in the media and eventually 
academic researchers joined the discussion. The main focus was to determine whether the 
decrease in prices was supply or demand driven, similar to the prior discussion on the rise 
of oil from 2000 to 2008. But different to the previous decade, the supply side as well as 
the demand side had undergone fundamental changes. The additional shale oil resources 
have restricted the, once dominant, power of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) and undermined the notion of imminent oil resource scarcity.  On the 
demand side, it has triggered China to become the most important market for crude oil 
imports. Meanwhile, the growing dependency of China in the past decade has increased 
the concerns by Chinese authorities on energy security. In response and supported by the 
recent slowdown of economic growth, Chinese authorities changed their economic 
strategy from quantitative to qualitative growth targets. The new policies concentrate on 
less energy dependency as well as social stability within the country. Concerns on 
sustainable economic growth is addressed, while the Communist party is concerned to 
remain its legitimacy for power. 
 
Both developments have been described with the term “New Normal” as the changes are 
considered structural and permanent. Although, this opinion seems to be shared by market 
observers as well as academic researchers, little literature has captured this change. The 
hypothesis of changing regimes, resulting in structural breaks, has been extensively 
discussed, however, often concentrating on geopolitical events, financial speculation and 
the financial crisis of 2008. Little quantitative academic research can be found on the 
“New Normals” in the oil market and the Chinese economy, whereas numerous business 
reports and articles have covered the matter. 
 
This study fills the gap in existing academic literature and concentrates its evaluation on 
the observed structural changes in the oil markets and China´s economy. It successfully 
uses a dynamic multiple linear regression model to support arguments in favour of a 
structural break in 2008. Further, by doing so, it enables to observe changes in the 
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importance of fundamental variables driving the market. More than the majority of the 
observed results considering significance level of past Brent Crude oil prices, US and 
Chinese oil imports, Chinese GDP growth, CNY/USD exchange rates, Shanghai Stock 
Index level, urban investments, energy intensity levels and the industrial production index 
support the qualitative observations of changes in the international oil market and China´s 
economy specifically. It is found, that a detailed specification of the model, considering 
economical and structural changes in China, describes better the price changes of Brent 
Crude in the sub-sample periods of 2000 to 2008 and 2009 to 2015 than the base model, 
which only considers historic Brent crude prices and imports. The consideration of 
economic variables further enhances the explanatory value over the entire period in 
comparison to the base specification. Previous studies (Mu and Ye 2011) have neglected 
such an extensive analysis, and restricted their study on imports which showed to be non-
significant. Therefore, this paper considerably adds to existing literature, as it critically 
assesses whether China´s imports are the best measurement of its impact on oil prices.  
 
The most important conclusion of this research is therefore, more than the specific 
regression results, that a detailed analysis of the oil market and China leads to a better 
understanding of econometric results and inherent data limitations. This is of high 
importance as changing oil prices have a large impact on oil importing as well as oil 
exporting countries. A close relationship between economic growth and oil prices has 
been agreed on and, after all, recent deflationary pressure has also been attributed to low 
oil prices. The effects on economic performance by the oil price are therefore apparent 
and observable. A better understanding of the fundamentals, that are driving the oil prices, 
supports the finding of reasonable economic targets as well as effective economic and 
energy policies.   
 
This paper will proceed by presenting the qualitative analysis of the changes in the 
international oil market and the Chinese economy. It is followed by an overview of 
academic literature on international oil prices, economic and oil price relationships and 
the China Factor. The review includes a discussion of econometric techniques. In the third 
chapter, the method and data of the research is presented. It is followed by a discussion 
of the results and the conclusion.  
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1.! The Time of New Normals 
 
Since the financial crisis, important changes have taken place in the global oil market and 
in the Chinese economy. The shale oil revolution changed the dynamics of the 
international oil market. Meanwhile, China has targeted qualitative economic growth 
after economic growth rates were disappointing and concerns on the health of its economy 
were rising.  
 
This chapter will provide the most important insights into the two markets. The changes 
observed in this context will argue in favour of new fundamentals driving the crude oil 
price. The analysis will provide a set of variables that are expected to contribute to the 
estimation of the impact on international oil prices by China´s oil demand and be used 
considered in the econometric analysis of this paper.  
 
1.1. The New Normal in the Global Oil Markets – The Effects of the Shale Oil 
Revolution 
 
The most recent decline in oil prices, starting in 2014, has caused many to reconsider the 
classical assumptions on the economics of oil. Today, it seems clear that the decline was 
caused by an unexpected increase in conventional oil (non-US production) and a decline 
in world economic growth (Badel and McGillicuddy 2015, Baumeister and Kilian 2015). 
The reason for why the market was not affected by prior decreases in conventional oil 
supply can be found in the shale oil revolution which started in 2009. The created 
additional shale oil output from the US did not disrupt the oil price and did not create a 
downward pressure on prices as it might be expected by economic theory, ceteris paribus. 
Instead, the additional output added to the stability of oil prices, as supply from traditional 
oil producers, such as Libya, was disrupted (Mănescu and Nuño 2015).  
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Figure 1: Crude Oil Price Evolution, 1970 - 2015 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration (2015) 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) spot price and the 
acquisition cost of crude oil prior to 1986. Current oil price levels below 50 US-Dollar 
per Barrel (USD/barrel) are very low compared to the last decade, but oil prices have been 
at much lower levels in historical comparison (for examples prior to 2000 and prior to 
1975).  
 
The fast expansion of shale oil rigs in the US was supported by country specific 
advantages. After all, shale oil extraction is derived from shale gas extraction combining 
hydraulic fracturing with horizontal drilling. The procedure is, therefore, based on well-
known principles and shale oil resources can be found numerously in other countries, 
with Russia holding the largest resources of shale oil reserves worldwide. But the US had 
the experience of extracting shale gas, legal incentives for landowners, including private 
ownership rights, existing infrastructure of pipelines that support the distribution of oil 
and easy access to global capital market funding (Mănescu and Nuño 2015). These 
advantages combined with high oil prices motivated the shale oil to take place in the US.  
 
As a result, the US transformed from an oil importing country to a net oil exporting 
country and is expected to become energy self-sufficient by 2030. Whereas the shale oil 
rig count in the US has been rising until 2014, it began to decline once prices started to 
decrease in 2014. Even though break-even prices for shale oil extraction range from 30 
USD/barrel to 100 USD/barrel, market observers estimate the average break even price 
to be at 50 USD/barrel (Rapier 2016). Once prices decreased in 2014, OPEC and 
especially Saudi Arabia was expected to cut production. However, they surprised markets 
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when they did not do so and instead maintained production levels to force high-cost oil 
producers out of the market, including shale oil producers. The downward price trend 
continued and at the end of 2014 and a decline in US shale oil rigs was observed. 
Additional investments into the shale oil industry stayed absent causing maturing rigs not 
to be replaced. The short life-cycle of shale oil rigs contributed to this development. By 
2016, the market observed a second development: debtor-in-possession financing 
allowed shale oil companies, who had filed for bankruptcy, to continue production and 
even invest in the productivity of existing rigs1. The strategy by shale oil producer was to 
stay in the market, until prices would increase again to the critical value of 50 USD/barrel 
(as they did in May 2016).  
 
As soon as the critical price of 50 USD/barrel is reached, the market expects shale oil 
production to increase again2. This behaviour of shale oil producers defines them as swing 
producers and limits the price range of oil considerably (given constant demand). The 
previous market power of OPEC over oil price levels is hence restricted to levels below 
50 USD/barrels and bears considerably high opportunity costs (Mănescu and Nuño 2015). 
Alternatively, the shale oil market could continue to evolve and enhance its technology 
to decrease production costs further, and become more competitive3 at prices below 50 
USD/barrel, further restricting OPECs market power.  
 
The emergence of shale oil production has hence not only changed the role of the US in 
world oil markets, but also decreased the market power of OPEC. Furthermore, traditional 
theorems considering oil as a scarce resource and discussion on peak oil production have 
been muted to wide extent. Additionally, it is unlikely, that the market will evolve 
backwards, as shale reserves in China and Argentina are expected to be developed once 
the required infrastructure is developed. Therefore, the development can be considered of 
structural and sustainable nature, characterizing the shale oil revolution to have caused 
new market principles referred to new economics of oil.  
 
#
######################################################
1 See the articles by the market observers Rapier (2016) and Gopinath and Schneyer (2016) for a detailed 
discussion of the matter. 
2 Uncompleted wells, which are referred to as “fracklog”, can quickly start production within six months, 
requiring lower capital investments than conventional crude oil rivals. 
3 See also The Economist (2014b) and Crooks (2015) 
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1.2. China´s Economic Development – A Path towards Qualitative Growth 
 
The shale oil revolution might have just occurred at the right time. Due to the extensive 
growth of China´s economy, China´s demand for energy and specifically oil increased in 
the short run (Yuan et al. 2008) and long run (Zou and Chau 2006). As China transformed 
from an oil net-exporter into a net-importer in 1993, it had to consider new sources for 
crude oil. Oil sources came primarily from trading partners in the Middle East and 
Africa4, sometimes competing for resource with the US or undermining international 
embargoes set by the US (Shinn 2010). Zweig (2005) underlined the growing tension, 
caused by the competition for future oil reserves and international secure transportation 
of oil. Referring to the power transition theorem5, if not carefully managed, such a 
challenge to the power of the US could have resulted in severe suffering of international 
relations. To a great extent, the shale oil revolution hence eased the tensions over future 
oil reserves.  
 
China has experienced an average economic growth rate of 10% between 2000 and 2011. 
The growing industry was motorized by the country´s industrialization. The growth 
resulted in rising demand for commodities, including oil. Since 2014, GDP growth rates 
have been disappointing market expectations and have, therefore, been observed closely 
by market participants. For the first time in 2012, the Chinese economy did not meet its 
target growth rate, when industrial production and exports started to decrease. Until the 
end of 2015, quarterly year-on-year (yoy) growth had slowed down to 6.8% in the last 
quarter.  
 
The slowdown in economic growth reflects different economic developments and has 
been interpreted as the consequence of past political market interventions. As much as 
they are currently discussed in media, they were observable already in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis. Morrison (2009) reasons uneven economic growth and a high 
dependency on foreign trade to have made China subject to the financial crisis in 2008 in 
the first place. The importance of exports had previously motivated Chinese authorities 
to peg the Chinese Yuan (CNY) against the US Dollar until 2006. Eventually, the peg 
was restored after the financial crisis and, although, the Chinese government stressed 
######################################################
4 The international trade flows of commodities to China are illustrated in Appendix 1. 
5 The power transition theorem states, that if the power of a nation is challenged by another nation, the 
nation in power will undermine (declare war on) the increase of the power by the challenging nation as 
long as it has an advantage.##
# 7#
internationalization efforts, the Yuan was recently devaluated in May 2016. This is 
interpreted to hinder future development and to undermine past internationalization 
efforts, such as the addition of the CNY into the IMF reserve currencies basket6.  
 
The pressure on the CNY increases, as the Federal Reserve Bank is planning to loosen its 
monetary policy further. This would force China to either spend additional foreign 
reserves on the devaluation of the CNY or allow the currency to appreciate. If Chinese 
authorities allow a free floating currency, the Yuan is expected to increase significantly, 
as the currency is considered to be undervalued (Balding 2015). The pessimism on the 
future development of the Chinese Yuan and the Chinese economy can be observed in 
the amount of capital outflow of the economy. The Chinese government reacted by 
implementing stricter capital controls and by increasing taxation on exchange 
transactions in 2015 and 2016. The trend of Chinese companies and households to rather 
invest in foreign assets reflects to a reasonable extent the distrust in future economic 
prospects. Eventually, any actions by the Chinese government to limit capital outflows 
would question their economic management skills (Balding 2015). 
 
Besides net capital outflow, the devaluation of the Yuan has contributed to the 
evolvement of cheap credit (Morrison 2009). This resulted in oversupply capacities and 
bad loans, which impose today a severe problem for the Chinese economy. Most recently, 
Chinese debt is rising faster than economic growth and low interest rates have been used 
to re-leverage non-performing loans. Especially public debt, and more specifically debt 
levels of state-owned enterprises (SOE), are of concern. Gracie (2011) and Morrison 
(2009) argue the Chinese government to be the reason for the problem: Through 
continuously and unrestricted support for SOE, resources are diverted away from 
efficiently, profitable businesses and instead unprofitable SOEs, also referred to as 
Zombie Companies, are kept alive. Market observes do not agree, on whether the problem 
will self-correct itself or whether the conflict between economic and political objectives 
can be resolved by the Chinese government (Curran 2016, Gracie 2015). Lastly, however, 
capital requirements for Chinese banks have been lowered and the falling real estate 
market raises concerns over the highly leveraged economy, drawing similarities to the 
real estate market crisis in the US, which resulted in the financial crisis of 2008. In May 
2016, Curran (2016) reported for Bloomberg, that Chinese authorities started to allow for 
######################################################
6 An overview over internationalization efforts and time in which the CNY/USD was pegged or devalued, 
can be found in Appendix 2. 
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more defaults and that the Communist Party Newspapers reported China´s debt pile as 
the “original sin” which would not support long term economic health. This can be 
interpreted as a change in the government´s sentiment towards its rising debt levels and 
slowdown in economic growth. Alternatively, it can be interpreted that the circumstances 
forcing the Chinese government to act have harshened. 
 
Meanwhile, business success in China has been traditionally tied to the relationship of 
business owners to the Communist Party. Corruption is an eminent problem in China and 
the regulatory environment is poor (Morrison 2009). Intellectual ownership rights are not 
well established and regulations are not transparent and found to be inconsistent. 
Additional to the inefficiencies created by the credit market, and decreasing economic 
growth, the Chinese stock market fell severely in the summer of 2015. It resulted in an 
additional increase of capital controls, to which the Chinese government reacted with 
additional government intervention in the financial markets. As Figure 4 shows, the 
different government interventions as well as currency policies could be observed in the 
Shanghai Composite Index.  
 
Figure 2: Shanghai Composite Index, 2014-2016 
 
 
 
Source: Curran (2016) 
 
Most importantly, a growing economy is perceived by the Chinese government vital to 
secure social stability (Morrison 2009). Public unrest had been growing in 2005, when 
the Chinese population did not perceive to be benefitting from the rapid economic growth. 
Lately the income gap between the rural and urban area and environmental pollution had 
been of rising concern. Balding (2015) argues that the Chinese government will, 
therefore, more extreme than in Western countries, try to foreclose unemployment and 
hence mute possible protests. However, to target the economic problems and secure 
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economic growth stability, Balding (2015) argues, no measures would be without 
negative consequences for at least some part of the population. One way the government 
is trying to achieve this balance is by increasing energy efficiency and decreasing energy 
intensity. A number of reforms and measure have set in place, to transform the economy 
and support qualitative growth. The set of rules has been referred to as China´s structural 
reforms and describe the transition from a manufacturing industry to a service oriented 
industry. 
 
1.3. China´s Structural Reforms – The Impact on Oil Demand 
 
Given the strategic value of oil, the commodity has been traditionally of high concern to 
oil importing and exporting nations. Therefore, many oil importing countries, including 
China, are targeting energy security as the dependency on oil imports is perceived risky 
(Roncaglia 2003). Energy security can either be accomplished by ensuring sufficient 
resources and safe transportation from the exploration side to industries and households 
or by reducing energy intensity and energy efficiency. Energy intensity in any country is 
expected to decrease over time, assuming economies to develop into service oriented 
industries and technology to allow increases in energy efficiency. China has targeted both 
options. This chapter will therefore examine policies specifically implemented to target 
energy efficiency and intensity as well as structural reforms changing the energy intensity 
and efficiency levels.  
 
The imports of oil have been rising since 1993, as consumption levels exceeded 
production levels and oil reserves in China were declining7. The reserve to production 
ratio for oil (number of years until traditional oil reserves deplete) was estimated to be 12 
years in 2007 by Pang et al. (2009). The peak of production might be delayed when energy 
efficiency is increased and energy intensity is reduced. The target rate of 16% less energy 
consumption per unit of GDP has been announced within the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011 
– 2015) by the Chinese government. This implied a shift from an economy, based on 
manufacturing, to a service-industry. The IEA measures oil intensity as the amount of oil 
products used to generate Yuan 1 Billion of GDP (IEA 2015). In 2014, the oil intensity 
was measured to be at 0.54 kb/d for Yuan 1 Billion of GDP. Compared to levels when 
China was just entering the heavy industry sector in 2004, this is a 34% decreased. The 
######################################################
7 Appendix 3 provides a short discussion on China´s Domestic oil fields.  
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IEA expects the oil intensity to decrease further to 0.43 kb/d in 2020. Besides energy 
intensity, other key targets covered lower carbon intensity and a higher share of non-fossil 
energy. On the other hand, Li (2007) points out the supremacy by Western countries over 
Asian countries in world-oil usage and the gap between them. If China was to reach the 
same per capita levels as Western countries, it would translate into for higher energy 
consumption and hence more oil demanded. 
 
In 2015, a cap on total energy consumption (4 billion tons of coal equivalent) in 2015 was 
introduced. This gives reason for the industry (IEA 2015) and academics (Meidan, Sen 
and Campbell 2015) to reference the set of policies and the following changes in the 
Chinese energy market as the “new normal”, adopting the term first used by Xi Jinping. 
In the 13th five-year plan (2016 – 2020), the Chinese government underlined to aim to 
aspire social inclusivity and environmental sustainability by decreasing manufacturing 
overcapacity and stimulating technological innovation. Technological innovation and 
private investments specifically apply to the energy sector (EIA 2015). The pricing 
schemes in the energy sector are increasingly determined by market forces and increased 
energy transmission infrastructure. Efficiency gains were recorded at 3.7% per annum 
between 2008 to 2014 and forecasted efficiency gains from 2015-2020 are expected to 
match these levels (IEA 2015). 
 
The new strategy for economic growth concentrates on the quality of growth, accepting 
lower absolute economic growth rates between 6% and 7%. A sustainable growth is 
considered to be also socially stable and hence might diminish excessive social tensions 
(Roncaglia 2003). A matter, which is of constant concern for the Communist party, as its 
legitimacy is considered to be dependent on strong and sustained growth (Shinn 2010). 
Additionally, future economic growth should be driven by domestic consumption instead 
of net exports, investments or government spending. However, Gracie (2015) underlines 
that China´s demographic structure and debt problem have not been addressed to this 
point and that essential structural reforms have failed.  
 
It is uncertain, whether the demand for oil by the manufacturing industry will be replaced 
by an other sector of the economy (Kawa 2016b).  But although the times of extensive 
economic growth might be over, the demand for oil per person in China is still far below 
levels in America and Europe. Whereas China´s citizens only consume one ton oil 
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equivalent per year (TOE/year), levels in Europe are at four TOE/year and eight TOE/year 
in the US (Anandan and Ramaswamy 2015).  
 
The demand for diesel and gasoline products is decreasingly attributed to the industry 
sector. The percentage of diesel demand allocated to the industry sector has almost halved 
in 2014, compared to levels at almost 40% in 2002. A similar trend can be observed in 
the demand allocation for gasoline (Meidan, Sen and Campbell 2015). Meanwhile, the 
allocation of demand for gasoil and diesel to transportation has been rising compared to 
other sectors, while the demand for motor gasoline and jet fuel is expected to continue to 
grow further in absolute terms as well (IEA 2015). Therefore, it is likely, that the 
transportations sector in China will continue to its significant contribution to oil demand 
growth, as it has done since 2008 (Kawa 2016a). 
 
China´s per capita vehicle ownership is much below the per capita vehicle ownership in 
developed countries, although, car ownership numbers have risen in the past years. 
Furthermore, although the populous country provides a large potential market, its urban 
density is self-limiting and road infrastructure is much less developed than in the US or 
Europe. Past and future environmental concerns have and will result in policies impacting 
the use and purchase of cars (McCracken 2010). Given the development of the oil use 
intensity of cars, the evolvement of electric cars and the state of China´s economic 
development, it might not be necessary that increased car ownership increases the China´s 
demand for oil. 
 
The above argumentation may mislead to the assumption, that if a growth in oil demand 
from the transportation sector is observed, it would reflect economic growth. However, 
McCracken (2010) points out that an increase in domestic car sales, must not necessarily 
be in line with the China´s economic development. Instead, the government subsidised 
car sales in rural part of China and decreased taxes on newly purchased small vehicles. 
Car sales further might not indicate the number of people who are actively using the 
vehicles. Cars have been considered a status symbol for the middle and while car sales 
have been declining in 2015, car registrations increased (Kawa 2015). 
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2.! Literature Review 
 
The discussion in academic literature has been very controversial and not all authors agree 
on a demand driven oil price development, but rather consider crude oil supply changes8, 
OPEC output restrictions9, speculative behaviour by market participants and/or financial 
speculation10 and inventory levels11 as significant forces. Others have concentrated their 
studies on the macroeconomic affects of oil price shocks12. Given the number of research 
conducted, this literature review will concentrate only on a selection. 
 
The selection will concentrate on econometric techniques used to study oil prices. The 
chapter will give an overview on different methods, the discussion of linearity and non-
linearity between oil prices and the macro-economy and the importance of regime 
changes. The literature review will proceed with an overview on different results found 
in regards to the impact of China on the international oil prices. 
 
2.1. Econometric Techniques 
  
Reviewing literature on the oil price leads to the observation that studies either analyse 
the oil market movements and changing regimes in hindsight, or (more often) models are 
tested to forecast future oil prices. Generally, the benchmark crude oil prices, Brent Crude 
Oil or West Texas Intermediate are considered for such analysis. 
 
Fattouh (2007) differs between non-structural models, demand supply models and 
informal models, and concludes none to provide sufficient forecasting power. Baumeister 
and Kilian (2016) argue that the reason for significant forecasting errors in the estimation 
of future crude oil markets might not be because of unknown determinants of the crude 
price, but rather because of forecasting errors in the estimation of explanatory variables. 
Furthermore, they observe forecasting errors to change in size depending on the nature of 
the demand or supply shock.  Behmiri and Manso (2013) highlight that there is no 
consensus on which techniques are most reliable when forecasting crude oil prices. They 
differ between qualitative and quantitative methods. Qualitative methods would include 
approaches such as web text mining but are not considered in this review of existing 
######################################################
8 E.g. Gallo et al. (2010) 
9 E.g. King, Deng and Metz (2011) 
10 E.g. Fattouh, Kilian and Mahadeva (2012) 
11 E.g. Bern (2011), King, Deng and Metz (2011) 
12 E.g. Jones, Leiby and Paik (2004)#
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literature. Rather, econometric methods are concentrated on and more precisely structural 
models. Structural models are divided by Behmiri and Manso (2013) into OPEC 
behaviour models, inventory models, combination of OPEC behaviour models and 
inventory models and models based on supply and demand. Although, they find only little 
evidence for the forecasting power of structural models, they highlight their explanatory 
value for past price movements.  
 
It can be observed in previous literature, that there has been a trend from using linear 
models to describe the relationship between economic growth and oil prices until the mid-
1980s to non-linear specifications afterwards (Ghalayini 2011). The reason for the shift 
in the techniques is a study by Mork (1989) that showed that the US economic activity 
replied asymmetrically to real oil price changes: Whereas there was a significant impact 
by oil price increases on the economic activity, there was no significant impact observed 
when the oil price was declining. More recently Krugman (2016), reporting as a market 
observer for the New York Times, wrote that last decline in oil price did not have expected 
positive effects on the economy, but rather, the marginal size of change led to negative 
implications for world economic growth. Therefore, the traditional relationship between 
oil price declines and the economy, might not hold true anymore. Krugman (2016) argues 
the deleveraging effect by oil producers results in negative externalities for the global 
economy and the change in paradigm to be caused by the short cycle investments of the 
shale oil industry. In literature, Hamilton (2010) observes non-linearity of larger changes 
in oil prices using Kilian and Vigfusson (2010) as a reference paper. Ghalayini (2011) 
and Hamilton (2010) agree, that the review of literature conducted on the subject provides 
no clear answer.   
 
Whether linearity is found or not often depends not only on the method (Ghalayini 2011), 
but also on the data sets used for the model (Hamilton 2009). Cong and Wei (2008) further 
underline the difference effects the stage of development of a country has on the linear or 
non-linear relationship between crude oil prices and economic growth.  As a non-linear 
relationship might be apparent for OECD countries and developed countries, the same 
might not be true for developing countries such as China. Ghalayini (2011) underlines, 
that although the trend is apparent in empirical literature, the same trend cannot be 
observed in the theoretical literature. The exception she finds is based on the dispersion 
hypothesis developed by Lilien (1982), which is also considered by the analysis of Cong 
and Wei (2008) when studying the impacts of crude oil prices on the Chinese stock 
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market. Lilien (1982) highlights the different effects oil crude price changes have on 
different sector, depending on whether they are energy efficient or energy intensive, and 
hence lead to readjustments across sectors which require different sets of time.   
 
Once a relationship between economic growth and the oil prices is established, most 
academic papers agree that they might not be robust over time. Instead, it is usual to 
observe significant results for tests, that assess structural breaks in the models. Hamilton 
(2008) underlines that oil price changes are affected by different regimes at different 
times.  Kilian and Hicks (2013) consider the period 2000 to 2008 without structural 
breaks, while Lechtahler and Leinert (2012) restrict the sample to 2003 to 2010 because 
of the observation of a structural break in 2003 in most time series, and criticize the results 
of studies not accounting for this specific break. Gallo et al. (2010) also find a structural 
break in March 2003 in the demand from China. They argue the Iraq war to be the reason 
for the structural break, while the increasing economic growth from China attributed in 
their opinion for the earlier structural break in their data set in 1991.  Furthermore, they 
highlight that evidence for structural breaks differs between countries. Du, He and Wei 
(2010) confirm the existence of structural break in January 2002 (for the period between 
1995 and 2008) and reason them with the changes in China´s oil pricing mechanism. Ji 
(2012) found a similar change in the impact of explanatory variables, assessing 
fundamental variables only to have a long run impact before the financial crisis, while 
short term oil price behaviour was explained by speculation.  Such mechanisms were set 
off during the period of the financial crisis and fundamental explanatory power was re-
established after the financial crisis.  
 
2.2. The China Factor 
 
The resulting increase in demand for crude oil from China is argued by Kilian and Hicks 
(2013) and Hamilton (2008) to have driven the international crude oil prices up from 2000 
to 2008. Gallo et al. (2010) found the consecutive rise in oil prices from 2009 onwards 
caused by growing demand for oil from China. The latest decline in oil prices starting in 
2014, was argued by Anandan and Ramaswamy (2015) to be due to low growth rates of 
China´s economy. Other, such as Bern (2011) highlights the many additional factors that 
determine the oil price besides supply and demand fundamentals. Explanatory variables 
could be expected to include stock markets and foreign exchange markets besides 
economic growth.  
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Beirne et al. (2013) analysed the China factor on the world economy through quantifying 
the influence of Chinese GDP growth on oil prices. Using a country-level demand model, 
based on 1965 to 2011, crude oil prices are estimated from 2010 to 2030. They find an 
increasing premium added to the price of oil by China. Kilian and Hicks (2013) stress the 
market´s underestimation of the respective growth rates and observe the real price of oil 
to react to unexpected growth in emerging in markets in a hump-shape, measured by 
revisions of professional GDP forecasts from 2000:12 to 2008:12. The measured 
surprises are observed to exist in a higher extent for Asian economies than for OECD 
economies13, namely from China and Russia but also for OECD country Japan. Annual 
revisions of Chinese economic growth rates´ estimates by 0.1 percentage points led to a 
five percent increase of the crude oil price. Kilian and Hicks (2013)´ findings, based on a 
linear regression method and historical decomposition, confirm the results by Kilian 
(2009), who used a structural VAR model. The observation is contradicted by Lechtahler 
and Leinert (2012). Lechtahler and Leinert (2012) found that demand from emerging 
countries (India, Russia, South Africa, Indonesia and China) did not contributed 
additionally to the impact of the demand from OECD countries during the increase of oil 
prices from 2003 to 2008.  Only during the peak of the oil price in 2008, a difference in 
the effect of cumulative demand and OECD demand was observed. Du, He and Wei 
(2010) find similar results as Lechtahler and Leinert (2012) for the period from 1995 and 
2008, using a multivariate vector autoregressive model.  They found no oil pricing power 
by China on the oil market.  
 
Kilian (2009) differs between the effect of supply and demand shocks on the oil price. 
On the demand side, he differs between shocks specific to crude oil and demand shocks 
effecting global demand for all commodities. In his analysis of the real price of oil from 
1975 to 2007, he found changes in expectations result in precautionary adjustments in 
demand, specifically effecting crude oil and resulting in a sustainable, immediate and 
large change in the real price of oil. Contrary, the effects by demand shocks on all 
commodities appear with a time lag but are also persistent. Kilian (2009) concludes most 
changes in the oil price to have resulted from demand side shocks and the increase in the 
real price of crude oil from 2003 to 2007 to have been driven by an increase in the 
######################################################
13 The analysis concentrates only on the United States, Germany and Japan as OECD representatives, while 
non-OECD countries are represented by Brasil, Russia, India and China (BRICs). 
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aggregate demand for industrial commodities as well as specific increasing demand for 
crude oil. 
 
Additional to the studies presented above, Kilian and Lee (2014), Fattouh, Kilian and 
Mahadeva (2012) and Smith (2009) support the impact by Chinese economic growth on 
the crude oil price. Mu and Ye (2011) found China´s imports not to significantly impact 
the oil price from 2002 to 2008 and conclude China not to have had a significant impact 
on the rising oil prices.   
 
Whether the relationship between economic growth and the oil price is bilateral or 
unilateral is the subject of many additional studies. While some studies assume a bilateral 
relationship for which they make use of the vector autoregressive (forecasting) technique, 
other consider granger causality tests to identify the direction of a possible significant 
impact or calculate price elasticities. Ghalayini (2011) finds the impact of crude oil prices 
on economic growth to be dependent on the state of an oil net importer or oil net exporter. 
China, as a net importer of oil since 1993 is found to have a negative correlation between 
changes in oil prices and Chinese economic growth from 1986 to 2010. The economy can 
be affected by an oil price change through either the demand or supply side. Using the 
demand side channel, the disposable income of consumers is positively affected. When 
oil price rises, products derived from oil are expected to become more expensive and 
hence less income is available for other goods and services. As oil prices increase, the 
costs for producers using oil as an input factor increase as well and hence negatively 
impact investment decisions. The supply side channel considers the increase in 
production costs when oil is used as an input factor and hence can result in a reduction of 
the output by the firm.  
 
Gallo et al. (2010) observe demand variables not to significantly impact oil prices, but 
changes in the oil prices to effect demand and supply variables from 1990 to 2009. Askari 
and Krichene (2010) find oil demand price elasticity very low and/or insignificant for the 
period from 1970 to 2008, confirming earlier results from Cooper (2003), who found no 
significant price elasticity of demand for China from 1979 to 2000. Instead Askari and 
Krichene (2010) found oil demand mainly responsive to income. Results by Hamilton 
(2008) contradict the study, when he observed that from 2002 to 2007 price elasticity of 
demand at lower levels than in 1980. He argues that this development is in line with the 
main demand for crude oil deriving from transportation which only has little substitution 
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possibilities, compared to different uses of oil, demanded to a higher extent before, 
allowing more substitutions. Bern (2011) observes that the transportation sector was 
inelastic to the high prices of oil in 2008 but private consumers were outweighed by 
industrial users of crude oil, who cut production.  
 
Behmiri and Manso (2013) underline the use of non-oil variables such as economic 
activity, interest rates, exchange rates and other commodity prices in structural models 
(see also Bern 2011). Although they criticize the forecasting performance, they observe 
fundamental variables to explain price movements well. However, the complexity of 
structural models and data limitations restricts their use for such purposes and therefore 
models using time-series techniques are used more frequently. Gallo et al. (2010) describe 
in their review of literature, economic growth, inflation and other economic indicators to 
provide inconclusive evidence.  Ghalayini (2011) highlights that oil prices can also have 
a converse indirect effect on economic growth through influencing foreign exchange 
markets and inflation. The findings on whether the economic growth impact the oil price, 
vice versa, or whether there exists a bilateral relationship are not conclusive. Ghalayini 
(2011) reasons the difference to appear, as different models propose different results. If 
an increase in economic activity would lead to higher oil prices, then the effect of higher 
oil prices on the economy, described by Ghalayini (2011) as feedback relationship, can 
mitigate the direct impact.  
 
Askari and Krichene (2010) and highlight furthermore, that the demand for crude oil 
depends besides economic activity also on demographic and technological factors. 
Urbanism and residential expansion will impact the demand for energy. In rural areas, 
vehicle substitutes are limited whereas the use of vehicles in large cities is limited. 
Additionally, rural areas might also not be connected as much as urban areas to the energy 
grid in developing nations. Crompton and Wu (2004) estimated the growth of energy 
consumption to decline by 2010, due to structural changes in the economy. Additionally, 
technological factors will impact energy intensity and energy efficiency of a country and 
for example, the loss of energy in the refining process of oil, or energy efficiency of 
vehicles. Not accounting for the complexities of the supply and demand determinants will 
increase the costs of misspecification and omission errors for econometric models (Askari 
and Krichene 2010). 
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3.! Model and Data 
 
This chapter explains the model used in the analysis, discusses the methodology applied 
as well as the choice of parameters based on the qualitative economic analysis provided 
in Chapter 1.  
 
The analysis will consider the time period from 2000 to 2015. This time interval will 
include the industrialization of China´s economy as well as the financial crisis and the 
shale oil revolution. The data is limited to December 2015, as some economic indicators 
considered for this analysis have not been published for later period by mid-2016. 
Although a longer time series would increase the number of observations and hence 
enhance the asymptotic properties of estimators (Lechtahler and Leinert 2012), it also 
would lead to a higher probability of structural breaks in the time series describing the oil 
market. The monthly intervals are in line with most structural models reviewed by 
Behmiri and Manso (2013).  
 
The explanatory variables considered in this analysis, are expected be to some extent 
endogenously defined. This is reasonable for the close interaction between oil prices and 
economies. To account for endogenous variables, co-integrated vector autoregressive 
(VAR) models have been applied in previous academic literature. The method is 
neglected for this analysis, for the same reasons as Askari and Krichene (2010). Co-
integrated VAR models include the analysis of the co-integration factors of all variables 
which are numerous in this analysis. Furthermore, the model would have constraints in 
the identification of assigning values to parameters and whether their relation belongs to 
the vector space of co-integration vectors. Therefore, dynamic multiple regression model 
is estimated. The restriction on the interpretation of its coefficients is out-weighted by the 
possibility to consider different variables for the analysis of China´s impact on the oil 
price.  The relationship between the economic indicators and the oil price is considered 
to be linear for developing countries (Cong and Wei 2008). China is categorized as a 
developing country, based on the low per capita levels of the economic indicators in 
international comparison (Li 2007).  
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3.1. Model 
#
The oil price is assumed to be based on supply and demand, which through market 
clearing fulfils an equilibrium condition in each month. In equilibrium the quantity 
demanded (QD) is equal to the quantity supplied (Qs), equation 1.0. 
 
QD = QS (1.0) 
  
QS = cS + βSP pt +  βS(j) pt-j + uS,t 
j= 1,2, …, 12 
 
(2.0) 
QD = cD + βDChina QDchina, t  + βDChina(i) QDChina, t-I + βDC QDC, t  + βDC (i) QDC, t-I + βDChinaIV pt QDChina, 
t + βIVChina(i) pt-i QDChina, t-i + βDUS QDUS, t + βDUS(i) QDUS, t-i + βIVDUS pt QDUS, t + βIVDUS(i) pt-i QDUS, 
t-i + uD,t 
i= 1, …, 6 
(3.0) 
 
The world aggregate supplied (2.0) is defined by a dynamic model, assuming production 
to be supplied by residual producers whose price setting decision is simulated recursively 
by current and past oil prices (Stevens 1995). The quantity demanded (3.0) is dynamically 
modelled by considering the demand from China (QDChina) and the US (QDUS)), who are 
the biggest consumers of energy and the biggest importers of crude oil in the time period 
from 2000 to 2015. The different economic structures lead to different impacts on oil 
demand in response to changes in the oil price (Askari and Krichene 2010). The 
difference is accounted for through interaction variables (pt QDChina and pt QDUS).. In 
addition, explanatory variables can be included to describe the Chinese economic 
development and structural changes more accurately, which will take the place of QDC. 
The intuition for equation 2.0 and equation 3.0 is described in more detail in Appendix 4. 
The equations presented above are simultaneously solved for pt , which results after 
simplification of the coefficient representation in equation 4.014.  
 
pt = cp +b QDchina, t + b (1+i) QDChina, t-I + γt + γt-i + bIV, China) pt-i 
QDChina, t-i + bUS QDUS, t  
+ bUS, (1+i) pt-j QDUS, t-j  + βIVDUS(i) pt-i QDUS, t-i – bsupply pt-j + 
up,t 
(4.0) 
j= 1, 2, … , 12 
i= 1, …, 6 
 
cp =!"#$  –!"%$  up,t =&$ (uD,t – uS,t)  
b =!!'#()*+,!$    b, (i) = '#()*+,,(*)$     
bIV, China =!!'01()*+,(*)!$    bIV, DUS =!!'01#2%(*)!$     
bUS =!!'#2%!$    bUS, (i) = '#2%,(*)$     
bsupply =!!'%,(345)!$       
######################################################
14 The calculations used to solve equation 3.0 and 4.0 simultaneously is presented in Appendix 4. 
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3.2. Methodology 
 
The base case is Specification 1 which accounts for China´s imports, US imports, their 
respective interaction variables and lagged oil prices. Specification 2 will add additional 
explanatory variables to the model, representing more strongly the changes in the Chinese 
economic development and the overall sentiment on the Chinese economy. Specification 
3 considers variables that are reflecting the structural changes in the Chinese economy. 
Before Specification 2 and Specification 3 add their explanatory variables, the previous 
Specification is reduced in its from using the stepwise backwards elimination process. 
 
Table'1:'Methodology'
pt = c cp +b QDchina, t + b (1+i) QDChina, t-I + γt + γt-i + bIV, China) pt-i QDChina, t-i + bUS QDUS, t  
+ bUS, (1+i) pt-j QDUS, t-j  + βIVDUS(i) pt-i QDUS, t-i – bsupply pt-j + up,t 
j = 1, 2, … , 12 
i = 1, …, 6 
 
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 
 
pt – Brent Crude Price 
QDchina - Chinese Imports 
QDUS –US Imports 
 
 
γGDP, t – Gross Domestic Product 
γCNY/USD, t – CNY/USD 
γEquity, t – Stock Market Index 
 
γIndustry, t – Industrial 
Production Index 
γUrban, t – Urban Investments 
γTOE – Energy intensity 
 
'
Source:'Author´s'Table'
 
The results are expected to show, i) whether oil demand from China is significant during 
2000 and 2015, ii) if structural changes can be observed in the model by testing for 
structural breaks, iii) if during the different regimes, indicated by structural breaks, the 
significance of the explanatory values changes, and if so iv) if such changes can be 
explained through the previous economic analysis on China and the oil market. Finally, 
v) the different variables considered in each specification allow to observe, if such 
variables add to the explanatory power of the model and vi) if the results confirm or 
oppose previous findings discussed in the Literature Review. 
 
The large set of independent variables and their lagged equivalents limit the model in the 
statistical tests that can be conducted. Therefore, especially concerning heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation, the calibration of the model is specifically considered. For example, 
instead of the White Test, the Breusch-Pagan Godfrey test is consulted to test for 
heteroskedasticity. Additionally, multicollinearity will be analysed in more detail, given 
the increased likelihood of such by the included lagged explanatory variables.  
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Given the previously discussed likelihood of endogeneity in the different specifications 
and the complex nature of the parameter coefficients in 4.0, the analysis will neglect to 
comment on the coefficient estimates and rather concentrates on the test statistics.  
 
3.3. Data 
 
The monthly averages of Brent Crude oil spot prices are published by the Energy 
Information Administration. The nominal price of the Brent Crude Oil price is used 
instead of the real price which would be adjusted for inflation over time. Fan and Xu 
(2011) highlight the advantage of the nominal price to be more sensitive to short term 
impacts on the oil price from other markets. The time series starts in 1999 to allow the 
regression modelling in 2000, given the consideration of lagged Brent Crude oil prices.  
 
To reflect China´s and US´ demand for oil, the official import levels are chosen. The 
import data, differently to consumption data, reflects the transition by the US from the 
world´s biggest crude oil importer to a temporary net-exporter after the shale oil 
revolution. The US imports of crude oil were taken from the Energy Information 
Administration as monthly data and was recorded in thousand barrels. China´s crude oil 
and refined petroleum products (liquid products only, measured in metric tons) imports 
are published by General Administration of Customs of China on a monthly basis with a 
two-week time lag. The series is considered by Mu and Ye (2011) the “single most 
important barometer” to present China´s oil demand. The rising oil imports in 2015 can 
be explained by the increases in strategic oil reserves (Meidan, Sen and Campbell 2015) 
and reflect the rising concerns over energy security by the Chinese authorities (Zweig 
2005). It is to highlight, that different units for oil imports are considered. A 
transformation is not attempted, as such would only consider a rough estimate. The 
conversion between barrels and metric tonnes required the knowledge of the specific 
gravity level of the oil product considered and the official imports published by the 
Chinese authorities refer to refined petroleum products as well. This increases the 
likelihood of heteroskedasticity in the regression model. Both time series start in July 
1999, to allow for the consideration of six lagged variables in the modelling of the 
regression from 2000 to 2015. 
 
For Specification 2, the CNY/USD and the Shanghai Stock Index monthly average values 
are taken from the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The GDP growth data is also 
published by National Bureau of Statistics of China, but as it is only available on a 
quarterly basis, the missing values are created using linear interpolation. Market 
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observers have often highlighted the limitation of the opaque techniques used by China´s 
authorities, however, this observation will not be controlled for in the further analysis. 
For Specification 3, the manufacturing index and urban investments are considered, 
which are also published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China as well. They are 
available on a monthly basis but only from mid-1999. Therefore, the time interval for 
Specification 3 will be restricted from April 2000 to December 2015. The energy intensity 
level of primary energy for China are taken from the databank of the World Bank. It is 
only available on an annual basis, for which the missing values are created by linear 
interpolation. The manufacturing index as well as the Shanghai Stock Index are both 
considered as indicators for China´s stability in the transition period from quantitative to 
qualitative growth (Preston et al 2016). They reflect not only economic stability, but given 
the previously discussed link between economic development and government 
performance, they also reflect political stability. 
 
Almost all time series are found to be non-stationary, using the augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) test and therefore are transformed into their first difference to achieve stationarity 
of the variables. The exception are the interaction variables and urban investments. The 
difference of the energy intensity level remains non-stationary, for which the second 
difference is considered. The respective descriptive statistics are presented in the Table 
2. 
Table'2:'Descriptive'Statistics'Main'Variables,'2000@2015'
  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. 
 
Skewness  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera  Prob.  Observations 
BRENT_D 0.07 13.73 -25.65 5.84 -1.0999 5.6686 95.68 0.0000 192 
CHINA_IMPORTS_D 15.33 624.70 -703.52 221.69 -0.2813 3.6877 6.31 0.0425 192 
CNYUSD_D -0.01 0.19 -0.13 0.03 0.7155 16.5923 1494.38 0.0000 192 
GDP_D 0.00 0.80 -0.83 0.35 0.1297 2.9792 0.54 0.7628 192 
INDUSTRIAL_INDEX_D -0.01 16.70 -15.90 3.18 0.3378 15.0137 1158.29 0.0000 192 
SHANGHAI_INDEX_D 11.32 747.83 -1082.99 240.77 -0.8275 7.6986 198.53 0.0000 192 
TOE_CAPITA_DD 0.02 6.89 -5.04 1.06 1.0362 23.0724 3257.56 0.0000 192 
URBAN_INVESTMENTS 93016.91 501445.50 954.87 109422.70 1.6582 5.1287 124.24 0.0000 192 
US_IMPORTS_D -54.62 91809.00 -84041.00 25278.51 -0.0452 4.6286 21.28 0.0000 192 
VI_CHINA_1 -73.69 5707.68 -8484.85 1355.08 -0.5216 13.5305 895.84 0.0000 192 
VI_US_1 -6740.24 957157.80 -1600817.00 180538.50 -2.6132 38.8506 10500.63 0.0000 192 
Data obtained using Eviews Package 
Source: Author´s Table 
#
Considering a model concentrating on supply and demand fundamentals alone, it is likely 
to be underspecified. Therefore, as suggested by Fan and Xu (2011), dummy variables 
for important political events are added. Such consider in their analysis the collapse of 
the World Trade Centres on 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. For this analysis, the 
method is replicated and extended to account for the effect of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, 
tensions in Gaza in 2008 and 2009, the revolution in Libya in 2011, the revolution in 
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Egypt in 2013 and the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2013. Kilian (2009) argues that 
the consideration of exogenous political events covers to a high extent supply side shocks, 
as precautionary demand adjustments consider the uncertainty concerning future oil 
supply shortages.   
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4.! Results & Discussion  
In this chapter the results of the econometric analysis are presented and observations put 
into context with the prior economic analysis undertaken in Chapter 1. The interpretation 
of the results will be compared to previous results in literature and finally the validity of 
the model, its observations and interpretation discussed.  
 
4.1. Specification 1 
 
The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity is non-significant at 10% but the LM-Test 
indicates significant autocorrelation (10%) in the first lag. For this reason, the Newey-
West robust estimation technique is used to obtain the regression results. Specification 1 
is further found to have a structural break in December 2008, indicated by the Chow test.  
 
The null hypothesis of no structural break cannot be rejected at 10%, different to the 
remaining month of 2008. The breakpoint indicates with a time lag the financial crisis 
and its impact on the global demand for commodities, including oil. However, it does 
also indicate the start of the shale oil production in the US, which would later lead the US 
to transform from the biggest oil imported into a temporary net-oil exporter. Therefore, 
two sub periods are compared to each other from 2000 to 2008 (108 observations) and 
from 2009 to 2015 (84 observations). The observation confirms Hamilton´s (2008) 
expectation to find different regimes during different times.   
 
Table 3 shows the added dummy variables for geopolitical events do not to add 
explanatory value to Specification 1, but decrease the Akaike Information Criterion in the 
time period from 2000 to 2015. However, considering the two sub-samples created by the 
structural break, the dummy variables add explanatory value to Specification 1 in the 
post-2008 period. The statistical insignificance of the Iraq war, opposing results by Gallo 
et al. (2010) could be explained by the fact, that the political and geopolitical event pre-
2008 were all related to the US15 and hence their impact is likely to be reflected in the US 
import variables. However, the variables Libya, Crimea and Egypt describe geopolitical 
######################################################
15 The Iraqi war was initiated by a coalition, led by the United States and a (partial) result of the 9/11 terror 
attacks in New York. Hurricane Katrina hit the US in 2005, especially the region of New Orleans. The US 
had (has) strong interest in the Middle East and Israel, making the Gaza War from 2008 to 2009 a direct 
concern. 
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events with no involvement or strong ties to the US. Therefore, it can be argued, that the 
consideration of such separately, increases the explanatory value of the model.  
 
Table 3: Regression Results Specification 1 
 2000-2015  2000-2008  2009-2015  
C -0.2102  0.3254  1.2902   1.5912   -0.1142  0.0700  
BRENT_D_1 3.3567 *** 3.1518 *** 3.1200 *** 2.7742 *** 2.1383 ** 2.2889 ** 
BRENT_D_2 1.9827 ** 1.8671 * 0.7055   0.6244   0.8601  1.0382  
BRENT_D_3 -0.7066  -0.9266  -0.3658   -0.6025   -0.1522  -0.3091  
BRENT_D_4 0.6674  0.1722  -0.8748   -1.0068   -0.6563  -0.6528  
BRENT_D_5 -0.1793  -0.4975  -0.5599   -0.5395   0.9874  0.9642  
BRENT_D_6 -2.4252 ** -2.3344 ** -1.2180   -1.0379   -2.1126 ** -2.1947 ** 
BRENT_D_7 1.4175  1.5686  0.3740   0.5699   1.0083  0.6898  
BRENT_D_8 -0.5263  -0.1887  0.0698   0.0472   -0.4725  -0.3862  
BRENT_D_9 -0.6494  -0.7550  -1.5663   -1.7019 * -0.1359  -0.2847  
BRENT_D_10 1.3428  1.3141  0.1394   0.1986   -0.1233  0.1404  
BRENT_D_11 1.4819  1.4334  1.5091   0.8254   2.2570 ** 2.2663 ** 
BRENT_D_12 -1.2789  -1.4786  -1.8223 * -1.4804   -1.0325  -1.5733  
CHINA_IMPORTS_D -0.8851  -1.0605  -0.2511   -0.2799   0.0393  -0.3448  
CHINA_IMPORTS_D_1 0.8389  0.4978  0.4687   0.0506   0.2834  -0.3121  
CHINA_IMPORTS_D_2 1.0416  0.8262  0.7658   0.5313   0.1025  -0.5057  
CHINA_IMPORTS_D_3 1.2919  1.0811  2.2456 ** 1.9559 * -0.4595  -0.8865  
CHINA_IMPORTS_D_4 1.4126  1.2006  1.1652   1.1492   -0.0610  -0.3195  
CHINA_IMPORTS_D_5 0.2130  0.0734  -0.3673   -0.5657   -0.0429  -0.1334  
CHINA_IMPORTS_D_6 0.2407  0.1009  -0.1570   -0.3317   -0.0410  -0.0054  
US_IMPORTS_D -2.4858 ** -2.2042 ** -0.8880   -0.8678   -1.6881 * -2.0094 * 
US_IMPORTS_D_1 -1.1593  -1.0934  -0.8133   -0.8073   -1.0200  -1.2258  
US_IMPORTS_D_2 0.2244  0.3400  0.7544   0.8216   0.1449  -0.0703  
US_IMPORTS_D_3 1.1294  0.8008  0.7642   0.2868   0.8577  0.1812  
US_IMPORTS_D_4 -1.0060  -1.6078  -1.4069   -1.4750   -1.0522  -1.7489 * 
US_IMPORTS_D_5 -0.8133  -1.0632  0.6651   0.4341   -1.3385  -1.4982  
US_IMPORTS_D_6 -0.1011  -0.0653  0.0284   0.1721   -1.1055  -1.2202  
VI_CHINA_1 4.4528 *** 4.3605 *** 2.4034 ** 2.5372 ** 4.3741 *** 3.5335 *** 
VI_CHINA_2 0.3684  0.7097  1.3622   1.5169   -0.0015  -0.1614  
VI_CHINA_3 0.3232  0.5219  -1.0676   -0.9103   0.2833  0.1132  
VI_CHINA_4 1.2885  1.1465  1.5139   1.3760   -0.0951  -0.2689  
VI_CHINA_5 -0.6621  -0.6177  -0.5003   -0.5437   0.1094  -0.0290  
VI_CHINA_6 0.3971  0.4262  0.2817   0.4816   -0.2295  -0.5025  
VI_US_1 -2.3586 ** -1.8886 * -0.9706   -0.9731   -0.5578  -0.3796  
VI_US_2 -2.1374 ** -3.0718 *** -1.3176   -1.9567   -2.4014 ** -2.1994 ** 
VI_US_3 -1.1383  -1.2521  -1.3801   -0.5477   -0.2449  0.3693  
VI_US_4 0.8184  1.5778  2.4966 ** 2.2974 ** 1.2880  1.9172 * 
VI_US_5 0.2714  0.9612  -0.5195   -0.2244   0.7686  1.5901  
VI_US_6 1.1798  1.1799  0.9003   0.7143   1.1068  1.4221  
CRIMEA   -1.2672            -0.4144  
EGYPT   1.9772 **           2.4001 ** 
GAZA   -2.1785 **     -1.1552       
HURRICANE_KATRINA   0.4599      -0.2611       
IRAQUE   -0.0773      -0.1234       
LIBYA   -0.4083            -0.9042  
NINEELEVEN   -1.3049      -1.5030       
R^2 0.4126  0.4374  0.5672   0.5814   0.5589  0.5954  
Adjusted R^2 0.2667  0.2639  0.3289   0.3109   0.1864  0.2004  
Akaike Info Criterion 6.2367  6.2666  6.2270   6.2679   6.4977  6.4828  
Schwarz Criterion 6.8984  7.0471  7.1956   7.3358   7.6263  7.6982  
Hannan-Quinn Criterion 6.5047  6.5827  6.6197   6.7009   6.9514  6.9714  
*** The test statistic is significant at 1%, ** The test statistic is significant at 5% , * The test statistic is significant at 10% 
 
Data obtained using Eviews Package 
Source: Author´s Table 
 
Considering the specific variables, it is first to highlight, that the Variance Inflation 
Vectors indicate multicollinearity among the variables. As the variables reflect 
international macroeconomic relations, this is reasonable and not corrected for. Instead, 
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the analysis of the significant variables is undertaken with caution, as multicollinearity 
can lead to a bias in the test-statistic by artificially lowering the p-value. 
 
The lagged Brent price for one, two and six months are found to be significant for the 
entire period from 2000 to 2015. However, the lagged variables are differently significant 
for the two time periods. Whereas from 2000 to 2008 the most immediate Brent Crude 
prices are significant (Brent_D_1), the half-year lagged variable (Brent_D_6) becomes 
significant from 2008 to 2015. As discussed earlier, the price elasticity of supply 
enhanced after the shale oil revolution, which, maybe by coincidence, requires on average 
six month to set up production.  
 
The oil imports by China are not found to be significant for the entire period. but only the 
three month lagged variable (China_Imports_D_3) is significant for the time prior to 
2009. The bias of Chinese imported oil data has been highlighted in the previous 
discussion and could be interpreted to be validated by these results. The increase in 
official strategic reserves over time could be an explanation for no significance of import 
data for the time past 2008. Also, the three month lagged import data would be six weeks 
old after it has been published. This could possibly indicate the time, that the market 
needs to interpret the data, or on the other hand, be considered spurious.  
 
The analysis undertaken in Chapter 1 is validated, as US Imports became more important 
after 2008. Reflecting the change of the US from a net oil importer to a net oil exporter, 
the data becomes more influential in the expectation setting of the market participants. 
Considering the significance of the current data, which would not be published in the 
current month, point towards the market transparency given by the number of agencies 
estimating and publishing reports on the US oil market. 
 
The interaction variables were considered to highlight the change in imports given price 
changes. Especially for China this is crucial, as one might expect strategic reserves not to 
change in response to market price movements and instead to be strictly and continuously 
increased by the Chinese government. Also, infrastructure projects supported by the 
government are likely to increase oil demand. This demand would only show little 
sensibility towards price changes and the oil required could be more easily estimated by 
the market. Therefore, the change of oil imports that is due to price changes is likely to 
reflect to a better extent the price elasticity of demand. The sensibility might be more 
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difficult to estimate and hence has a higher impact on the changes in the Brent Crude 
price, also in regards to the market participants. This is in line with the observations made 
by Kilian and Hicks (2009) who found underestimation of Chinese economic growth rates 
to significantly drive the oil price. Although the interaction variables do not represent 
GDP, they do to some extent reflect unanticipated changes in crude oil imports. A change 
in the responsiveness of oil imports to price changes over time cannot be confirmed by 
the results and hence does not support the trend highlighted by Hamilton (2008) of 
decreasing price elasticity of demand. Meanwhile, the observation of Bern (2011) on 
differences between price elasticity of demand for private consumers and industrial 
producers can be somehow interpreted in the different significant levels of lagged 
variables between interaction variables representing China´s imports and US´ imports.  
  
As for the US, the change in imports upon price changes also reflect to some extent the 
price elasticity of demand and price elasticity of supply. As the four months lag 
(VI_US_4) is found to be significant for the period prior to 2009, the change of 
significance to the two months lag (VI_US_2) for the period after 2008, could indicate 
the increase of substitutes available for oil consumers. However, the interpretation is of 
assumptive nature, as a precise relationship cannot be described from the analysis 
undertaken in this paper. In regards to the price elasticity of supply. the time oil 
production can change in the US decreased after the shale oil revolution, as shale rigs are 
set up much faster. Hence, a decrease in the time lag could also indicate the changing US 
production levels and hence directly impact the level of imports required to meet US 
demand.  
 
4.2. Specification 2 
 
For Specification 2, Specification 1 is reduced by stepwise backward elimination of the 
most insignificant variables until the adjusted R2 and the Akaike Information Criterion 
cannot be improved. Afterwards. the variables for GDP growth, CNY/USD and Shanghai 
Index are added to create Specification 2. 
 
The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity is significant at 5%, whereas the LM-Test 
shows no significant level for autocorrelation. Therefore, the Newey-West method is 
applied to estimates heteroskedastic robust regression results. Although the explanatory 
variables show high levels of multicollinearity in the Vector Inflation Factors (Appendix 
5), the test statistics indicate sufficient significant explanatory variables. Results from 
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Specification 1 are confirmed, as the significance of the previous explanatory variables 
are robust (Appendix 6). Similar to Specification 1, the dummy variables do not add value 
to the explanatory power of Specification 2 for the time from 2000 to 2015. The R2 
decreases and the Akaike Information Criterion increases from 6.10 to 6.15 (Table 4). 
Specification 2 has a considerably higher explanatory value than Specification 1 and the 
reduced form of Specification 1. Although the regression model is increased by 17 
explanatory variables, reducing the degrees of freedom, the Akaike Information Criterion 
improves. Meanwhile, the first difference of the additional explanatory variables 
CNY/USD and the Shanghai Index show to be significant at 5% in their non-lagged form 
(confirming Behmiri and Manso 2013). Depending on the interpretation of such variables 
as speculative or fundamental, the long (short) run relationships between fundamental 
(speculative) variables and oil by Ji (2012) is opposed (confirmed). The change in GDP 
growth is found to be significant at 1%, also in line with results by Kilian and Lee (2014), 
Fattough, Kilian and Mahadeva (2012) and Smith (2009). All of these results remain 
robust when the dummy variables are added (Appendix 6). 
 
Table 4: Explanatory Value of Specification 2 
 2000-2015 
 
Specification 1 
(reduced form) Specification 2 
Specification 2 
(incl. Dummy Variables) 
R^2 0.4044 0.5035 0.5137 
Adjusted R^2 0.3188 0.3678 0.3505 
Akaike Info Criterion 6.1047 6.0999 6.1521 
Schwarz Criterion 6.5289 6.8125 6.9834 
Hannan-Quinn Criterion 6.2765 6.3885 6.4888 
Data obtained using Eviews Package 
Source: Author´s Table 
 
An analysis of the sub-samples is omitted, as the correlation between the variables of 
GDP growth, the Shanghai Stock Index and CNY/USD are too high (Appendix 5) and 
results in no significant variables in the sub sample. 
 
4.3. Specification 3 
 
In the same way as before, Specification 2 is reduced using the stepwise backward 
elimination technique. Once neither the adjusted R2 nor the Akaike Information Criterion 
can be improved by omitting explanatory variables, the additional variables representing 
the Industrial Production Index, Investments in Urban Areas and Energy Intensity levels 
are added. 
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Specification 3 does not perform significant in the Breusch-Pagan test for 
heteroskedasticity and shows no significant level of autocorrelation for the tested lags. 
Multicollinearity is not apparent in most Vector Inflation Factors (Appendix 7), but for 
urban investments.  
 
There is no additional value added to the explanatory power of Specification 2 and its 
reduced form by the Specification 3. Instead the adjusted R2 decreases from 0.41 in the 
reduced form of Specification 2 to 0.35 in Specification 3 (Table 5). The Akaike 
Information Criterion increases as well, which means that the penalty value for additional 
variables added is higher that the explanation of the development in the change of Brent 
Crude prices.  
 
Table 5: Regression Results Specification 3 
 
2000-2015 
  
2000-2008 
  
2009-2015 
 
 
 
 
BRENT_D_1 3.3843 *** 4.5786 *** 4.2893 *** 2.0958 ** 2.0083 ** 1.9623 * 1.7960 * 
BRENT_D_2 1.1960  0.8822  0.8283  -0.1554  -0.2390  0.6665  0.6236  
BRENT_D_3 -1.1211  -1.3638  -1.3103  0.5469  0.3994  -0.5045  -0.3176  
BRENT_D_6 -3.5594 *** -3.0587 *** -2.8097 *** -1.4012  -1.3209  -0.0211  0.0875  
BRENT_D_7 1.6845  1.2387  1.2372  1.4235  1.3255  1.2900  0.8834  
BRENT_D_9 -1.0374  -1.0119  -1.0610  -1.4317  -1.3302  0.2393  0.3187  
BRENT_D_10 2.1657 ** 1.9410 * 1.9372 * -0.1794  -0.0409  0.1874  0.2699  
BRENT_D_11 1.8364 * 1.4202  1.4175  -0.6130  -0.6937  2.2952 ** 2.1981 ** 
CHINA_IMPORTS_D -2.3178 ** -2.6887 *** -2.6161 *** -1.4534  -1.3795  -1.3318  -1.0254  
CHINA_IMPORTS_D_2 1.2528  0.8394  0.8998  1.3158  1.2874  0.3930  0.4871  
CHINA_IMPORTS_D_3 2.2647 ** 1.9065 * 1.9369 * 2.2862 ** 2.2526 ** 0.6840  0.7277  
CHINA_IMPORTS_D_4 2.6366 *** 2.5913 ** 2.4528 ** 1.8126 * 1.8180 * 0.0177  -0.0356  
US_IMPORTS_D -2.0452 ** -1.1742  -1.1857  -1.8694 * -1.7460 * -1.0865  -1.2509  
US_IMPORTS_D_3 1.6503  1.7042 * 1.5755  0.2315  0.0352  -0.4422  -0.5087  
VI_CHINA_1 5.3998 *** 3.9949 *** 3.8213 *** 0.4547  0.4662  3.9019 *** 3.2629 *** 
VI_CHINA_4 2.1659 ** 2.2169 ** 1.9374 * 1.6181  1.3149  -0.4798  -0.4713  
VI_US_1 -2.1129 ** -1.6807 * -1.8116 * -0.4853  -0.4869  -2.4780 ** -2.8032 *** 
VI_US_2 -2.8026 *** -2.1971 ** -2.3634 ** -2.0196 ** -1.4304  -3.6045 *** -3.5811 *** 
VI_US_3 -1.4874  -1.2706  -1.3933  0.2572  0.3457  -1.9004 * -1.8017 * 
VI_US_4 1.5094  0.6471  0.8923  0.8388  0.7659  0.2137  0.2219  
VI_US_6 2.3440 ** 2.0176 ** 1.7828 * 0.5558  0.5010  1.8915 * 1.9207 * 
CNYUSD_D -2.6711 *** -1.7255 * -1.7478 * -1.8101 * -1.6143  -0.1421  -0.2869  
CNYUSD_D_2 -1.2173  -0.9730  -0.9443  -0.8117  -0.8045  0.1774  0.4700  
CNYUSD_D_3 1.9324 * 1.0430  1.0747  2.3916 ** 2.3223 ** -0.3738  -0.2464  
CNYUSD_D_4 -1.2271  -1.1777  -1.0503  -1.8256 * -1.6781 * 0.1219  0.2644  
CNYUSD_D_6 1.7485 * 1.8105 * 1.5380  1.6566  1.6458  -2.4045 ** -2.5302 ** 
GDP_D 3.5037 *** 3.0425 *** 2.9173 *** 1.6544  1.4504  2.9490 *** 2.6568 ** 
SHANGHAI_INDEX_D -2.3607 ** -2.2422 ** -2.2996 ** -1.2914  -1.2381  -2.9942 *** -3.1855 *** 
SHANGHAI_INDEX_D_5 2.8047 *** 2.9079 *** 2.8574 *** 1.7799 * 1.6614  -0.8829  -0.6411  
               
INDUS_INDEX_D   0.6116  0.4135  1.7729 * 1.4625  -1.1696  -1.1430  
INDUS_INDEX_D_1   0.6279  0.3513  1.5984  1.1396  -0.9088  -0.8023  
INDUS_INDEX_D_2   -0.4738  -0.6656  0.6997  0.4434  -0.3390  -0.5409  
INDUS_INDEX_D_3   0.1409  -0.0474  1.1081  0.7418  -0.6370  -0.4816  
INDUS_INDEX_D_4   0.4221  0.2497  1.1465  0.8131  -0.5597  -0.6164  
INDUS_INDEX_D_5   0.1135  -0.0013  0.9279  0.8213  0.0646  0.1308  
INDUS_INDEX_D_6   0.4235  0.3588  0.8178  0.7962  -0.3934  -0.4844  
URBAN_INVEST   0.8066  0.7829  -2.1850 ** -2.0178 ** -0.1093  -0.1348  
URBAN_INVEST_1   -0.9779  -0.9069  1.9078 * 1.7007 * 0.1336  0.0905  
URBAN_INVEST_2   1.0731  0.9528  -1.2112  -1.1268  -0.0597  0.0012  
URBAN_INVEST_3   -1.0806  -0.9119  1.2867  1.2116  -0.0753  0.0401  
URBAN_INVEST_4   1.0830  1.0889  -1.3224  -1.2449  -0.0090  -0.0028  
URBAN_INVEST_5   -0.5256  -0.6314  1.5154  1.4460  -0.1853  -0.4319  
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URBAN_INVEST_6   -0.2538  -0.3032  -1.6816 * -1.4540  -0.3752  -0.4393  
TOE_CAPITA_DD   0.3498  0.6737  1.6005  1.3262  -0.7746  -0.5718  
TOE_CAPITA_DD_1   -0.7224  -0.3721  -0.4683  -0.1761  0.2539  0.1617  
TOE_CAPITA_DD_2   0.3572  0.5553  -1.2225  -0.6988  1.4379  1.5217  
TOE_CAPITA_DD_3   -0.0063  0.0000  -2.1666 ** -2.1088 ** 2.4912 ** 2.4562 ** 
TOE_CAPITA_DD_4   0.0596  0.1369  0.4234  0.3586  0.1962  0.1848  
TOE_CAPITA_DD_5   0.7780  0.7913  0.0331  0.0711  3.3427 *** 3.6115 *** 
TOE_CAPITA_DD_6   -0.9894  -0.6990  1.3872  1.3079  0.4685  0.9122  
               
CRIMEA     0.1407        0.0581  
EGYPT     0.6193        1.2913  
GAZA     -0.7714    -0.3292      
HURRICANE_KATRINA     -0.0893    0.1650      
IRAQUE     -0.6694    -0.4717      
LIBYA     -0.2643        -0.0424  
NINEELEVEN     -0.3918    -0.6067      
               
R^2 0.4926  0.5224  0.5282  0.7541  0.7558  0.7468  0.7541  
Adjusted R^2 0.4055  0.3540  0.3280  0.5349  0.5020  0.3820  0.3418  
Akaike Info Criterion 5.9862  6.1677  6.2296  5.9189  5.9880  6.2043  6.2465  
Schwarz Criterion 6.4782  7.0253  7.2073  7.1827  7.3529  7.6512  7.7802  
Hannan-Quinn Criterion 6.1854  6.5152  6.6257  6.4311  6.5410  6.7860  6.8630  
*** The test statistic is significant at 1%, ** The test statistic is significant at 5% , * The test statistic is significant at 10% 
 
Data obtained using Eviews Package 
Source: Author´s Table 
 
The significance of past Brent Crude prices stays robust in Specification 3 and the 
importance of the lagged 1 (Brent_D_1) and lagged 6 (Brent_D_6) oil price is to 
highlight. China Imports (China_Imports_D) become more significant in Specification 3, 
after they showed no significance in Specification 1 and Specification 2. This therefore 
confirms the observations by Mu and Ye (2011) but limits their conclusion considerably, 
as the analysis finds China to have a significant impact on oil prices. Contrary, the 
variable for US Imports (US_Imports_D) becomes insignificant for Specification 3. The 
same is to observe for the currency variables (CNYUSD_D), whose test statistic becomes 
less significant compared to Specification 2. The explanatory variables for Chinese GDP 
growth (GDP_D) and the Shanghai Stock Index (Shanghai_Index_D) show robust results 
compared to Specification 2. However, the stepwise reduction of Specification 2 to 
Specification 2 –reduced has eliminated most of their lagged variables. 
 
The structural break in December 2008 holds true for Specification 3 at 1% (Chow Test). 
Similar to Specification 1, the dummy variables do not add to the explanatory value of 
the model in any (sub-)sample. The significant levels of the explanatory values added in 
Specification 2 changes between the two sub-samples, which is interesting to observe, as 
an analysis for Specification had to be omitted. CNY/USD shows to be significant only 
prior to 2009, whereas GDP growth and the Shanghai Stock Index became significant 
only after 2008. Whereas the CNY/USD was pegged the majority of time before 2009, 
the Chinese currency was mostly unpegged, although not freely floating, in the time 
afterwards. The significance of Chinese GDP growth on the oil prices developments 
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confirms the results by Beirne et al. (2013). The industrial index (Indus_Index_D) and 
the urban investments (Urban_Invest, Urban_Invest_1) are also shown to be only 
significant in the time prior to 2009. Industrial production was the driving force of 
China´s economic growth until 2008, but the change towards qualitative growth reduces 
the importance of the sector. The observed econometric results support the qualitative 
observation of structural economic change in China. Urban investments would increase 
the demand for oil until further expansion, for example infrastructure, limit additional 
consumption of energy (Askari and Krichene 2010). Given the high growth of Chinese 
urban areas before 2009, the change in significance levels indicates that such a plateau 
has been reached. Energy intensity (TOE_CAPITA), shows to partly change the 
significant time lags in the sub-samples. The lagged variable of 3 months is significant in 
both samples, whereas lag 5 becomes significant only past 2008. A possible explanation 
for why changes in China´s energy intensity impacts oil after 2008 with a longer delay 
could be found in the time the market needs to observe and interpret the new information. 
The efforts by the Chinese government to improve energy intensity and the new policies 
to support such a development might motivate bias in the reported data, for which the 
market could require additional information to verify the reported statistics. 
 
The added variables of Specification 3 add to explanatory value to the results from 
Specification 1 for the sub-samples. This comparison is restricted, as Specification 2 has 
not been regressed over the sub-samples. Over the entire period from 2000 to 2015, 
Specification 2 performs better than Specification 1 and 3. In all combinations, the 
dummy variables, reflecting geopolitical events, do not improve the explanatory value 
and are mostly not significant. The only exception is to be observed in Specification 1 for 
the time interval from 2009 to 2015. The Specification 1 and Specification 3 both perform 
better from 2000 to 2008 than from 2009 to 2015. Given the concentration on variables 
representing the demand from China, this supports the findings by Kilian and Hicks 
(2009) who conclude China´s demand for crude oil to have driven prices until 2008.  
  
The regression output shows some robust and some mixed results. The interpretation of 
the specific variables must be considered with caution, as multicollinearity exists to some 
extent in all specifications. Furthermore, most explanatory variables are defined 
endogenously in economic theory, which limits the conclusion to the extent, that results 
need to be confirmed in further studies.  
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5.! Conclusion 
 
In this analysis the changes in the oil market, and the undergoing changes in the economy 
of one of its biggest consumers, China, were analysed over the past 15 years. The changes 
have in common that both are referred to as the “New Normal”, describing a sustainable, 
different state compared to market conditions ten years ago. The shale oil revolution has 
been the reason for important structural changes in the crude oil market. On the supply 
side, the power of OPEC has been restricted by shale oil producers and transformed the 
US from the biggest net oil importer to a temporary net oil exporter.  It impacted the 
demand side directly, as the place of the biggest oil importer was then taken by China. 
For this reason, China´s demand for oil becomes of high interest. However, the demand 
for oil by China has considerably changed over the past. After the industrialization of its 
economy until 2008, the new scope of the government is to introduce qualitative growth 
rates, while transforming the economy into a service driven industry. This requires less 
oil and therefore changes the outlook for future demand growth significantly.  
 
The changes observed in the qualitative analysis have been studied quantitatively only to 
a limited extent in previous literature. The results obtained for the importance of China 
have been mixed and the findings of this paper support the argument that this is largely 
due to the data sets and variables used. The case has been made that the Chinese demand 
for oil is complex and therefore the variables need to be chosen with caution and 
awareness of their limitations. The approach has been used by providing a detailed 
econometric analysis of the subject and a critical review of the data to obtain valuable 
results. The methodology allows to compare the importance of different variables and 
model specification considering general economic indicators but also specific variables 
that reflect the structural changes taking place in China. The linear multiple regression 
based on a structural model provides a first analysis of the topic at the expense of the 
interpretation of parameters coefficients.  
 
It was found that a detailed approach can improve the explanatory power of the structural 
model that only considers import data. Additional variables considered, besides the 
classical import data of the US and China and GDP growth rates, are the Shanghai Stock 
Market Index, the CNY/USD exchange rate, energy intensity, urban investments and the 
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industrial production index. Additionally, interaction variables of oil imports and oil 
prices were created to reflect country specific changes in oil imports. The study observes 
the change of regimes in 2008, not only caused by the financial crisis, but also caused by 
the shale oil revolution. Besides changing significance level, the importance of lagged 
variables confirms observations of the qualitative analysis of higher levels of price 
elasticities of supply and demand. The econometric results allow for an analysis of the 
significance level of different demand variables from 2000 to 2015 and the change of 
their significance for the time period before and after December 2008. The qualitative 
observations can be observed and arguments on structural changes supported. Besides the 
actual results of the regressions, the main conclusion therefore is, that the method applied 
leads to a valuable econometric analysis of complex changes in the international oil 
market and the Chinese economy. Studies, such as Mu and Ye (2011), that consider net 
oil imports and found no significant impact by China on the oil price, might observe a 
significant impact, when considering alternative variables such as presented in this study. 
 
Therefore, the research in the field should be continued and future studies should try to 
estimate non-bias parameter coefficients which could then more specifically analyse 
obtained results in this study. Whereas in past literature the changes in the oil market and 
the specific and complex economic and political state of China have been considered to 
a limited extend, this research presents a method to account for the different 
characteristics. An application of the analysis to a two-stage least square estimation 
method and/or a structural vector autoregressive model would enhance the validity of the 
obtained results. In another step, the robustness of the results could be tested by 
comparing the added explanatory value when the demand by other countries is considered 
more explicitly.  
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Appendix 1: International Flow of Commodities 
 
Figure 3: Resource Flows into China, 2014 
 
 
Source: Preston et al. (2016), p.9 
 
Figure 8 shows the global resources flows equal to or greater than $1 billion. Of all 
worldwide resource, 98.3% flow into China. It is of apparent concern to China, to 
diversify the export countries it conducts business with. Nevertheless, regional 
interdependencies are created and natural resources are sometimes competed for.  
 
#  
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Appendix 2: CNY/ USD Development 
 
Figure 4: History of Internationalization efforts of the Yuan, 1994-2016 
 
 
Source: Li (2016) 
#
#
#  
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Appendix 3: China´s Oil Production 
 
Figure 5: China´s largest oil fields 
 
 
Source: EIA (2015), p. 8; Highlighted and additional legend added by author 
 
1: Daqing 
2: Tarim Basin and Junggar 
Basin 
3: Jilin 
4: Bohai Bay 
5: Yellow Sea 
6: South China Sea 
7: East China Sea 
 
Most crude oil production is placed onshore (80%) but recent extraction and production 
strategies have concentrated on offshore fields, while China´s energy policy also aims at 
additional investments in tight oil extraction. Incremental production increases are 
achieved by the new offshore fields as well as enhance oil recovery techniques used for 
mature onshore fields. The oldest onshore field is Daqing (northeast China, highlighted 
“1” on Figure 10) which contributes 19% of China´s total crude oil production (EIA 
2015). Daqing is exploited since the 1960s and is expected to produce 640,000 bbl/d by 
2020 compared to 800,000 bbl/d in 2014. Besides the limited reserves which require 
enhanced oil recovery techniques and hence translate into higher production costs, the 
lower international oil prices support the development. Production growth can only be 
observed in interior provinces, such as the Tarim Basin or Junggar Basin (northwest 
China, highlighted “2” on Figure 10), achieved by advanced oil extraction and improved 
drilling techniques to access more complex geological reserves. Hydraulic fracturing 
(fracking), targeted by the Chinese government to be extended, is existing in the onshore 
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field Jilin to mitigate declining outputs of the field (northeast China, south of Daqing, 
highlighted “3” on Figure 10). 
 
China´s offshore reserves are smaller than its onshore reserves and hence mature at a 
faster rate. Therefore, mostly deep-water fields are currently explored in Bohai Bay, 
Yellow Sea and South China Sea (highlighted “4”, “5” and “6” respectively on Figure 
10). Developments in the East China Sea (highlighted “7” respectively on Figure 10) are 
restricted due to territorial disputes with Japan, which are ongoing since 2009. Similar 
rising disagreements can also be observed on territorial claims in the South China Sea 
(“6”) between China and Vietnam and China and the Philippines. 
 
Given the limited onshore reserves, resulting in declining production growth rates 
compared to increasing production outputs until 2010, China must either access 
technological more advanced oil fields more profitable, extract more oil from shale oil 
reserves or concentrate and resolve territorial disputes in offshore locations to keep up its 
production levels. The challenges are mostly and especially faced by the national oil 
companies. 
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Appendix 4: Derivation of Structural Model 
 
For the analysis, quantity supplied is simplified by a function of past oil prices. The 
reasoning is based on the assumption, that historical prices reflect past equilibria of supply 
and demand. Hence, swing producers can extract required information on past demand 
from prices in order to anticipate current and future demand. Residual producers react 
directly to price levels and adjust their production (Stevens 1995). Time lags of the price 
are included to allow for a delayed reaction by oil producers. The time delay may not 
only result from time consuming changes in the production volumes16, but also result 
from temporary unchanged production levels due to hedging strategies or debt-in-
possession financing. For this analysis, historical oil prices of one year are considered. 
Given the monthly calibration, the time lags include 12 historical crude oil prices in 
equation (0.2)17. Oil supply is specified in a world aggregated form. Therefor, Qs 
considers oil producing companies and countries, OPEC members and non-members. 
Whereas oil supply can be affected by many country specific variable such as interest, 
exchange rates and technological factors, the aggregate world specification does not 
account for these country-specific variables (Askari and Krichene 2010). The parameter 
βSP describes the coefficient of the current oil price level explaining the changes in 
quantity supplied, whereas the “S”-index indicates the supply side and the “P”-index 
indicates the affiliation to the current oil price level. 
 
On the other hand, the demand function will be defined by the demand from China and 
the US. Previous to China, the US was the net largest oil importer of crude oil and 
therefore, the demand by both countries will also be considered in equation (0.3)18. In 
order not to propose a tautology and define the equation by definition (Halcoussis 2005), 
the demand from other countries is neglected. Considering the literature reviewed on 
demand price elasticities, one can conclude that the impact of oil prices on oil demand is 
different between households and industries. While households tend to be rather inelastic 
######################################################
16 The understanding that oil extraction, once the oil field is established, can vary relies on the theory of 
real options. Hence, the producer might pause production or reduce the output to make use of the time 
value, possibly allowing a future higher price to start production again or enhanced technology to produce 
at lower costs. Although, once fields are exploited, the establishment of new traditional oil reserves is very 
time costly (up to 5 years), the shale oil revolution allows for a quick set up of rigs (as fast as 6 months) 
with little to no costs of pausing production output.  
17 Equation 0.2. states: QS = cS + βSP pt +  βS(j) pt-j + uS,t ; j= 1,2, …, 12 
 
18 Equation 0.3. states: QD = cD + βDChina QDchina, t  + βDChina(i) QDChina, t-I + βDC QDC, t  + βDC (i) QDC, t-I + βDChinaIV 
pt QDChina, t + βIVChina(i) pt-i QDChina, t-i + βDUS QDUS, t + βDUS(i) QDUS, t-i + βIVDUS pt QDUS, t + βIVDUS(i) pt-i QDUS, t-i 
+ uD,t ; i= 1, …, 6 
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to price changes, industries relocate the costs or cut production. Considering for the 
difference between China and the US, also in terms of energy use by households and 
importance of manufacturing versus service industries, interaction variables are included 
in the demand equation. The interaction variables reflect, how the price of oil determines 
differently the quantity demanded by China and the US. Considering, that adjustments in 
the industry and households take time, time lags are included for both interaction 
variables. Considering the nature of many contracts, determining future quantity of sales, 
but also the semi-annual publication of performances by public companies, six lags for 
the price of crude are included, representing half-a-year.  
 
As the purpose of this analysis is to find the impact on the oil price, the two equations are 
solved simultaneously for the price of oil. To simplify the equation for further usage, 
lambda (λ) is introduced in equation 0.8.  
 
cS + βSP pt +  βS(j) pt-j + uS,t = cD + βDChina QDchina, t  + βDChina(i) QDChina, t-I + βDC QDC, t  + 
βDC (i) QDC, t-I + βDChinaIV pt QDChina, t + βIVChina(i) pt-i 
QDChina, t-i + βDUS QDUS, t + βDUS(i) QDUS, t-i + βIVDUS pt 
QDUS, t + βIVDUS(i) pt-i QDUS, t-i + uD,t 
(1.1) 
j= 1, 2, … , 12 
i= 1, …, 6 
 
 
 βSP pt + βDChinaIV pt QDChina, t 
+ βIVDUS pt QDUS, t 
= cD + βDChina QDchina, t  + βDChina(i) QDChina, t-I + βDC QDC, t  + 
βDC (i) QDC, t-I + βIVChina(i) pt-i QDChina, t-i + βDUS QDUS, t + 
βDUS(i) QDUS, t-i + βIVDUS(i) pt-i QDUS, t-i + uD,t– (cS + βS(j+1) 
pt-j + uS,t ) 
(1.2) 
j= 1, 2, … , 12 
i= 1, …, 6 
 
 
(βSP + βDChinaIV QDChina, t + 
βIVDUS QDUS, t) pt 
= cD + βDChina QDchina, t  + βDChina(i) QDChina, t-I + βDC QDC, t  + 
βDC (i) QDC, t-I + βIVChina(i) pt-i QDChina, t-i + βDUS QDUS, t + 
βDUS(i) QDUS, t-i + βIVDUS(i) pt-i QDUS, t-i + uD,t – (cS + βS(j+1) 
pt-j + uS,t) 
(1.3) 
j= 1, 2, … , 12 
i= 1, …, 6 
 
 
λ pt = cD + βDChina QDchina, t  + βDChina(i) QDChina, t-I + γt + γt-i + 
βIVChina(i) pt-i QDChina, t-i + βDUS QDUS, t + βDUS(i) QDUS, t-i + 
βIVDUS(i) pt-i QDUS, t-i + uD,t – (cS + βS(j+1) pt-j + uS,t ) 
(1.4) 
j= 1, 2, … , 12 
i= 1, …, 6 
 
 
λ = βSP + βDChinaIV QDChina, t + βIVDUS QDUS, t  
γt = βDC QDC, t    
 
γt-i = βDC (i) QDC, t-i  
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Gamma (γ) is also introduced in equation 1.4 to outline the demanded crude oil from 
China specifically, as the analysis will concentrate on the significance of this parameter. 
The remaining coefficients are generously simplified in the next equation. Given the 
complexity, their value will not be analyzed, but the test statistics on the significance of 
the parameter is still of value and is the center of this analysis. 
 
pt = cp +b QDchina, t + b (1+i) QDChina, t-I + γt + γt-i + bIV, China) pt-i 
QDChina, t-i + bUS QDUS, t  
+ bUS, (1+i) pt-j QDUS, t-j  + βIVDUS(i) pt-i QDUS, t-i – bsupply pt-j + 
up,t 
(1.5) 
j= 1, 2, … , 12 
i= 1, …, 6 
 
 
cp =!"#$  –!"%$  up,t =&$ (uD,t – uS,t)  
b =!!'#()*+,!$    b, (i) = '#()*+,,(*)$     
bIV, China =!!'01()*+,(*)!$    bIV, DUS =!!'01#2%(*)!$     
bUS =!!'#2%!$    bUS, (i) = '#2%,(*)$     
bsupply =!!'%,(345)!$       
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Appendix 5: Multicollinearity - Specification 2 
#
Table'6:'Vector'Inflation'Factors'Specification'2'
 2000-2015 2000-2008 2009-2015 
BRENT_D_1 3.24 7.37 3.93 
BRENT_D_2 3.75 3.40 8.13 
BRENT_D_3 4.00 8.16 4.14 
BRENT_D_6 4.47 5.72 10.99 
BRENT_D_7 5.01 7.91 13.54 
BRENT_D_9 2.80 5.10 9.29 
BRENT_D_10 4.72 4.10 15.75 
BRENT_D_11 3.99 6.51 10.15 
BRENT_D_12 4.29 6.50 8.86 
CHINA_IMPORTS_D 6.91 10.92 26.85 
CHINA_IMPORTS_D_1 11.65 15.06 33.82 
CHINA_IMPORTS_D_2 8.35 18.01 20.23 
CHINA_IMPORTS_D_3 10.02 22.17 18.27 
CHINA_IMPORTS_D_4 8.75 12.58 24.01 
CNYUSD 2.19 42.57 5.72 
CNYUSD_D 4.77 7.14 8.71 
CNYUSD_D_1 3.89 8.52 7.88 
CNYUSD_D_2 2.56 6.33 12.05 
CNYUSD_D_3 3.09 25.04 8.96 
CNYUSD_D_4 5.00 6.98 14.55 
CNYUSD_D_5 3.77 16.61 4.26 
CNYUSD_D_6 4.02 8.62 5.46 
GDP_D 5.66 16.63 27.34 
GDP_D_1 9.32 18.96 52.24 
GDP_D_2 11.39 13.32 67.66 
GDP_D_3 17.95 49.82 31.66 
GDP_D_4 18.09 33.88 47.21 
GDP_D_5 14.62 15.13 34.85 
GDP_D_6 8.42 13.48 16.90 
Data obtained using Eviews Package 
Source: Author´s Table 
#  
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Appendix 5: Regression Results Specification 2 
#
Table'7:'Test'Statistics''Specification'2,'2000'@'2015'
 
Specification 1  
(reduced) Specification 2 
Specification 2  
(incl. Dummy Variables) 
BRENT_D_1 3.5908 *** 3.4362 *** 3.2044 *** 
BRENT_D_2 2.1849 ** 1.0922  0.9335  
BRENT_D_3 -0.7062  -1.0875  -1.1423  
BRENT_D_6 -2.6275 *** -3.4979 *** -3.5812 *** 
BRENT_D_7 1.5468  1.4469  1.6008  
BRENT_D_9 -1.2245  -0.9938  -1.0014  
BRENT_D_10 1.3878  2.0462 ** 1.9008 * 
BRENT_D_11 2.0735 ** 1.4827  1.4932  
BRENT_D_12 -1.5441  -0.5418  -0.7079  
CHINA_IMPORTS_D -1.2085  -1.1681  -1.2602  
CHINA_IMPORTS_D_1 0.9991  0.5954  0.3692  
CHINA_IMPORTS_D_2 1.5136  0.9052  0.7700  
CHINA_IMPORTS_D_3 1.8198 * 1.5656  1.4721  
CHINA_IMPORTS_D_4 2.0655 ** 2.1633 ** 1.9986 ** 
US_IMPORTS_D -3.0948 *** -2.4095 ** -2.4255 ** 
US_IMPORTS_D_1 -1.5747  -0.8482  -0.9016  
US_IMPORTS_D_3 1.1033  1.4674  1.1895  
US_IMPORTS_D_4 -0.8051  -0.2979  -0.7458  
VI_CHINA_1 4.3867 *** 4.2789 *** 4.1112 *** 
VI_CHINA_4 1.0988  1.9517 * 1.7273 * 
VI_US_1 -2.9792 *** -2.1753 ** -1.9690 * 
VI_US_2 -2.2576 ** -2.2748 ** -2.8060 *** 
VI_US_3 -1.5155  -1.1980  -1.2678  
VI_US_4 1.3984  1.3909  1.5512  
VI_US_6 1.6687 * 2.1246 ** 2.2762 ** 
       
CNYUSD_D   -2.3084 ** -2.2040 ** 
CNYUSD_D_1   -0.4088  -0.4786  
CNYUSD_D_2   -1.0913  -1.0342  
CNYUSD_D_3   1.1017  1.1590  
CNYUSD_D_4   -1.1121  -0.9959  
CNYUSD_D_5   -0.0005  -0.0004  
CNYUSD_D_6   1.6236  1.3514  
GDP_D   2.8284 *** 2.6663 *** 
GDP_D_3   0.3379  0.2647  
GDP_D_6   0.7143  0.8899  
SHANGHAI_INDEX_D   -2.1217 ** -2.2168 ** 
SHANGHAI_INDEX_D_1   0.7306  0.7375  
SHANGHAI_INDEX_D_2   -0.5343  -0.4506  
SHANGHAI_INDEX_D_3   -0.5060  -0.7093  
SHANGHAI_INDEX_D_4   -0.2465  -0.0178  
SHANGHAI_INDEX_D_5   2.0732 ** 1.9751 * 
SHANGHAI_INDEX_D_6   -0.1217  -0.3590  
       
CRIMEA     -1.1034  
EGYPT     1.4647  
GAZA     -1.1440  
HURRICANE_KATRINA     -0.3875  
IRAQUE     -0.9707  
LIBYA     -0.4689  
NINEELEVEN     -0.8625  
       
R^2 0.4044  0.5035  0.5137  
Adjusted R^2 0.3188  0.3678  0.3505  
Akaike Info Criterion 6.1047  6.0999  6.1521  
Schwarz Criterion 6.5289  6.8125  6.9834  
Hannan-Quinn Criterion 6.2765  6.3885  6.4888  
*** The test statistic is significant at 1%, ** The test statistic is significant at 5% , * The test statistic is significant at 10% 
 
Data obtained using Eviews Package 
Source: Author´s Table 
#
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Appendix 6: Multicollinearity - Specification 3 
#
Table'8:'Vector'Inflation'Factors'Specification'3,'2000'@'2015'
 VIF   VIF 
BRENT_D_1 1.76  GDP_D 1.38 
BRENT_D_2 2.08  SHANGHAI_INDEX_D 1.56 
BRENT_D_3 2.17  SHANGHAI_INDEX_D_5 1.36 
BRENT_D_6 1.90  INDUSTRIAL_INDEX_D 1.86 
BRENT_D_7 1.74  INDUSTRIAL_INDEX_D_1 3.04 
BRENT_D_9 1.81  INDUSTRIAL_INDEX_D_2 3.37 
BRENT_D_10 1.91  INDUSTRIAL_INDEX_D_3 3.49 
BRENT_D_11 1.67  INDUSTRIAL_INDEX_D_4 3.31 
CHINA_IMPORTS_D 1.38  INDUSTRIAL_INDEX_D_5 2.73 
CHINA_IMPORTS_D_2 2.44  INDUSTRIAL_INDEX_D_6 1.70 
CHINA_IMPORTS_D_3 3.92  URBAN_INVESTMENTS 9.49 
CHINA_IMPORTS_D_4 2.63  URBAN_INVEST_1 19.34 
US_IMPORTS_D 1.48  URBAN_INVEST_2 17.74 
US_IMPORTS_D_3 1.37  URBAN_INVEST_3 16.96 
VI_CHINA_1 1.54  URBAN_INVEST_4 15.31 
VI_CHINA_4 1.83  URBAN_INVEST_5 15.29 
VI_US_1 1.94  URBAN_INVEST_6 8.24 
VI_US_2 2.57  TOE_CAPITA_DD 1.37 
VI_US_3 2.61  TOE_CAPITA_DD_1 1.32 
VI_US_4 2.16  TOE_CAPITA_DD_2 1.24 
VI_US_6 1.49  TOE_CAPITA_DD_3 1.37 
CNYUSD_D 2.18  TOE_CAPITA_DD_4 1.25 
CNYUSD_D_2 2.23  TOE_CAPITA_DD_5 1.14 
CNYUSD_D_3 2.50  TOE_CAPITA_DD_6 1.12 
CNYUSD_D_4 2.52    
CNYUSD_D_6 2.19    
Data obtained using Eviews Package 
Source: Author´s Table 
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